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The Fukushima Accident and Public Perceptions about Nuclear Power around 
the Globe – a Challenge & Response Model.  
In this paper we examine the impact of the Fukushima accident (March 2011) on public 
perceptions of nuclear power on a global scale. It is widely recognized that any future of 
nuclear power critically depends on public acceptance to sustain massive public subsidies. We 
will contrast conceptually and empirically two models of the ‘Fukushima effect’, an event & 
effect (EE) model (Kim, Kim & Kim, 2013) and our own challenge & response (CR) model. 
Firstly, we replicate Kim et al. (2013) who modelled retrospective opinion changes after 
March 2011 across 42 countries on a set of ‘objective’ predictors including geographical 
distance from Fukushima. But, instead of survey data ex-post-facto, we use historical opinion 
data 1996-2016 for 23+ countries. On historical data, the EE model has little explanatory 
power for opinion shifts, beyond the dependency on nuclear power in the energy mix. 
Secondly, we introduce the alternative CR model. Our hypothesis is that individual and 
societal responses to nuclear accidents are constrained by cultural memories. Memory, both 
individual and collective, is primarily adaptive and makes available schematic information to 
deal with novel situations. Memory creates familiarity and facilitates coping with uncertainty. 
The CR model introduces symbolic factors such as ‘Past Responses to Nuclear Incidents’, 
‘Nuclear Renaissance’, and ‘Long-term Acceptance Level’ to explain the Fukushima effect of 
2011. 
New abstract [April 2018] 
We examine the impact of the Fukushima accident (March 2011) on global public 
perceptions of nuclear power. We contrast conceptually and empirically two models, 
an event & effect (EE) model [Kim, Y., Kim, M., & Kim, W. (2013). Effect of 
Fukushima nuclear disaster on global public acceptance of nuclear energy. Energy 
Policy, 61, 822–828] and our own challenge & response (CR) model. We replicate 
Kim et al. (2013), who modelled retrospective opinion changes on a set of “objective” 
predictors, using historical opinion data 1996–2016 for 23+ countries. The EE model 
shows little explanatory power for opinion shifts beyond nuclear dependency in the 
energy mix. We argue that individual and societal responses to nuclear accidents are 
constrained by cultural memories, and introduce the alternative CR model. Memory, 
both individual and collective, is primarily adaptive and makes available schematic 
information to deal with uncertain and novel situations. The CR model explains better 
the responses to Fukushima with memory factors of “Past Responses to Nuclear 
Incidents”, of “Nuclear Renaissance” and “Long-term levels of Acceptance”. We are 
able to typify 23 countries according to their characteristic pattern of cultural memory 
and their Fukushima responses.   
Keywords: Fukushima; nuclear accident; nuclear disaster; public opinion; cultural memory 
Introduction 
On 11 March 2011, a massive earthquake reaching a magnitude of 9.0 MW off the East Coast of 
Japan triggered a Tsunami, which flooded the coast in the area of Fukushima, where a nuclear 
power station is located. The flooding caused a failure of the backup electricity supply needed to 
control the reactor. The reactor at Fukushima-Daiichi went out of control, critical and exploded. A 
massive evacuation of more than 150,000 people living in the vicinity ensued, and an evacuation of 
Tokyo was only avoided because of a fortunate turn in wind conditions.  The clean-up of the 
aftermath at the Fukushima nuclear plant continues to the present day. 
In this paper, we re-assess the Fukushima effect on a global scale. When we say ‘effect’ we more 
likely mean ‘response’. Rather than a mechanical cause & effect model, we consider a challenge & 
response (CR) model for how different societies perceive, interpret and infer action imperatives 
from an ‘event’ that occurred at some geographical distance. How does a society draw conclusions 
from a nuclear accident that happened elsewhere? Researchers have asked this question three times 
already in the history of civil nuclear power: after Three Miles Island (TMI; 1979), after Chernobyl 
(1986) and again after Fukushima (2011). The response to an accident that happened at home is one 
problem; a totally different affair is what has happened elsewhere. Our focus will be the remote 
responses to the nuclear accident in Japan (we therefore exclude Japan from our analyses). The 
meaning of Fukushima 3/11 for Japan is still in the making (Funabashi & Kitazawa, 2012) and 
might take some time as in the case of Chernobyl (Alexievich, 1997). 
 
Clearly, the societal response to a nuclear accident has many dimensions, involving 
operational, judicial, policy, and public opinion responses. The technical understanding of what 
went wrong has lessons for future operations (Nöggerath et al., 2011), for judicial apportioning of 
blame and liability; for the review of current nuclear power policy (Elliot, 2013) and for public 
attention in mass media and conversations about what had happened and what the ‘future’ might be. 
Public perceptions involve changing assessments of risks and support for nuclear power. Our 
present paper will focus on public opinion in global comparison. 
Nuclear protagonists around the world have recognized that there is no future for 
nuclear in the civil energy mix without public acceptance to sustain massive public subsidies, which 
are inevitable to absorb the large up-front investments, to insure the operational safety risks however 
small, to avoid nuclear proliferation, and to guarantee the cleanup at the end of the reactor life cycle. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) commits member states to report regularly on the 
processes of building public acceptance under section 2.3.6 of the Country Nuclear Power Profile. 
Although, compared to the details reported on policy and technical operations, this section is often 
short and thin in content (see http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/cnpp2016/pages/index.htm). 
At the high point of nuclear enthusiasm, the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI; 1974) reported on the ‘Nuclear Age’ and intimated how ‘few people have a clear 
idea of how extensive the spread of nuclear technology around the world has already become and 
how rapidly it will continue’. SIPRI predicted a ten-fold increase in energy production by the year 
2000 (SIPRI, 1974, p. 30); but things did not develop as planned for the then 19 nuclear energy 
producing countries and a further 20 countries with nuclear aspirations. By 2017, the global nuclear 
complex had less than doubled producing a fraction of predicted energy. 30 countries, many 
recruited from former USSR and Yugoslavia, are operating a declining park of 450 plants, 55 new 
ones are under construction out of which 35 are behind schedule (Economist, 30 Jan 2017). Nine 
countries are in the ‘Nuclear Club’ and also command the bomb (Norris & Kristanson, 2013). The 
present study will consider public opinion data from over 30 countries, many of which oscillate 
between entering and closing the Nuclear Age, and in order to reach this decision are anxiously 
monitoring public opinion, most of it for private eyes only. 
 
The impact of nuclear accidents on public opinion 
Previous research on the impact of nuclear accidents focused on public support for nuclear power, 
emphasizing three issues: a) did the accident mark a trend shift in opinion formation; b) was there a 
rebound effect, and c) who most likely changed opinion and behavior in response to events. 
 Three Mile Island, USA (TMI, 28 March 1979) 
TMI did not usher in a new nuclear opinion in the USA; it rather reinforced a trend change since the 
mid-1970s, which corrected consistently high levels of support during the 1960s to reach an anti-
nuclear majority in the 1980s (Rosa & Dunlop, 1994). Weart (1988) finds that negative US media 
coverage of the ‘atom’ overtook positive ones by the late 1960s. Hohenemser, Kasperson, & Kates 
(1977) had diagnosed mounting distrust and divergence between environmentalists and the public; 
safety monitoring did not keep track with the expansion of the nuclear park. Kepplinger (1988) 
finds news shifting after 1969 in Germany; by 1972 nuclear news was dominantly skeptical. Jasper 
(1988) shows how responses to accidents depended on the issue cycle: TMI strengthened the anti-
nuclear case in the US, while France and Sweden saw favorable opinions surge. Accidents are 
ambiguously coded signals and, amplified by media reportage, opinions are contingent on the local 
issue cycle and symbolic representations. Positions on nuclear power depend less on factual 
knowledge, but on what people imagine and value about the future.  
 
Chernobyl, former USSR, now Ukraine (26 April 1986) 
Verplanken (1989) reviews evidence from pre-post Chernobyl 1986 studies. He reports stronger 
effects on attitudes among residents living in fall-out affected areas, among pregnant women and 
farmers in Sweden. In Britain, anti-nuclear positions strengthened, while across Europe, responses 
followed existing attitudes on nuclear waste. While opposition strengthened, uncertainty regarding 
health hazards persisted and only a minority reported changing food choices. Across Europe, a 
consistent picture shows opposition increasing after Chernobyl, but rebounding to the long-term 
trend below pre-Chernobyl levels. These changes co-varied with the fall-out radiation dose. Risk 
perceptions of nuclear power increased the dread element, while the severity decreased. Supporters 
were more ambivalent and less stable in their positions as opponents. Verplanken’s three-wave 
study in the Netherlands showed that the catastrophic image of risks, and its association with 
nuclear bombs, became predominant after Chernobyl; most people came to stigmatize nuclear 
technology as fundamentally unsafe. Many studies reported declining confidence in governments’ 
handling of nuclear technology (Van der Plight, 1992, p. 126). It was later found that visual 
commemoration of events was significant. While visualization was light for controversies of the 
1990s, such as BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy otherwise also known as ‘mad cow 
disease’), road traffic, excessive alcohol consumption, and chemical waste, Chernobyl was a 
visually rich story in Sweden, Norway, UK, France and Spain. Chernobyl took on a new meaning, 
lifting the physical events accountable in terms of scientific risk, to one by divine force striking a 
sinful humanity (Boholm, 1998). The latter is best illustrated by the Noble Prize of Literature 2015; 
Sveltana Alexievich reflects in her ‘Chernobyl Prayer’: ‘Chernobyl is a mystery that we have yet to 
unravel. An undecipherable sign. A mystery perhaps for the 21
st
 century; a challenge for it 
…challenges more fiendish and all-embracing, although still hidden from view; yet after 
Chernobyl, something has cracked open’ (Alexievich, 1997, p25)          
 
Fukushima Daiichi, Japan (11 March 2011) 
With Russia, Spain, and Latvia as exceptions, the Fukushima accident lead to a universal loss of 
support for nuclear energy with implications for energy policies. The Germans and Swiss phasing 
out nuclear energy and the French reducing the number of plants, came in direct response to the 
Japanese events. Hindsmarsh & Priestley (2016), with a set of in-depth country analyses, show how 
policy responses vary from weak to strong strategic adjustments. The case studies point to social 
media as a new vehicle of knowledge dissemination, and highlight the discursive practices and 
national storytelling conditioning policy responses to Fukushima. In Finland, a traditional ‘nuclear 
exceptionalism’ allowed to sustain a clear distinction between them and us, the Japanese and 
Finnish technology. Similarly, in post-Soviet regimes, a purely technical discourse dominated the 
assessment and policy responses. Bernardi et al. (2018) show that far from a direct cause-effect, 
policy changes across Europe post-Fukushima require a pattern of factors, which make the situation 
‘ripe for change’. On public opinion, studies focus on prominent countries such as Italy (Prati & 
Zani, 2012), Switzerland (Siegrist & Visschers, 2012; Siegrist et al., 2014), Japan (Kato et al, 
2013), and Germany (Arlt & Wolling, 2016), used qualitative data and survey-based designs to 
characterise the specific national trajectories. A comparison of such historical trajectories is offered 
by a EURATOM project (HoNEST, 2017). 
 
The Fukushima disaster: comparing two different models to explain the global response  
We consider and compare conceptually and empirically two models that claim to explain the global 
variation of responses to the events in Japan of March 2011. On the one hand we analyse and 
replicate Kim et al.’s (2013) formulation of an event & effect (EE) model, which takes into account 
only physical factors of reactions across the world. Our own challenge & response (CR) model 
considers in addition traces of cultural memory as the determinant of local responses to the global 
event. We will test both models on our own data.  
 
The EE model of reacting to nuclear accidents 
Few studies compare the Fukushima effect across many countries. Kim et al. (2013) provides the 
broadest coverage. Using a WIN-Gallup Global Snap Poll administered within one month after the 
accident, 24556 responses from 42 countries are modelled post-Fukushima. The study concludes 
that energy mix, physical distance to Fukushima, and degree of media censorship explain some 
variation in self-reported opinion change. Yamamura (2012) also uses the WIN-Gallup data to 
gauge the aggregate relationship between risk of a nuclear accident and other risk experiences, and 
finds that perceived risk correlates positively with prior experience of technological, not natural, 
disasters.  
Kim et al. (2013) find that a country’s distance from Fukushima tends to increase 
negative reactions; apparently distance brings a decay function of information which amplifies fears 
of nuclear energy (ibidem, 2013, p. 826), assuming that closeness means complete and accurate 
information and less fear. On the other hand, nuclear energy production exerts mixed influences. 
With high density of nuclear reactors, public acceptance decreases more sharply. Longer operating 
time of nuclear parks also exacerbates negative shifts. Conversely, a larger nuclear energy share 
buffers changes in acceptance post-Fukushima. Lastly, where media environment is highly 
censored, opinion also become more negative than elsewhere. In sum, Kim et al. (2013) adhere to 
an implicit event & effect (EE) model, whereby opinions react to the ‘physics’ of an incident, 
contingent only on ‘objective’ factors. Furthermore, in the WIN-Gallup survey, with fieldwork end 
of March through early April 2011, respondents self-reported opinion change ex-post factum; it is 
more than plausible that hindsight is biasing this data.
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 We will show later that the WIN-Gallup 
hindsight effects are more severe compared to historical data from successive surveys; people over-
estimate their shift of opinion, when asked post factum. 
 
The CR model of responding to nuclear accidents 
The EE model has limited power to explain the variability of public opinion to nuclear power after 
Fukushima, as we will show below. This is however not the only drawback. The EE model also 
seem highly unrealistic; it over-generalizes the special case of physical contact with the accident. 
Most opinions are formed at a distance from events and on the basis of symbolic ‘images’ 
(Boulding, 1956), meaningful discourse of sense making (Taylor, 2016) and social representations 
in national ‘echo chambers’ of communication and supported by stereotypes of ‘us and them’2 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 2008; Farr & Moscovici, 1984). Public debates cultivate over years the symbolic 
resources to make sense of nuclear power. Humans respond to an accident outside the immediate 
danger zone based on ‘schemata’, not signals. Behavioural reactions to alarm signals, or to physical 
impact of pushing or pulling according to Newton’s Third Law of ‘actio = reactio’, are unlikely to 
occur at a distance. Most responses therefore occur at a psychological distance from the materiality 
of noise, water, combustion and radioactivity of Fukushima.   
Our alterative CR model postulates the response formation to nuclear incidents with a 
dual regulation: firstly, there is interpretive flexibility of the ‘challenge’, and secondly, there is 
flexibility in the ‘response set’. The event triggers a response, but the particulars are correlated to 
the ‘response set’, which embodies a symbolic representation of nuclear power. Thus, the response 
to a nuclear accident is the characteristic of a historically grown mindset and collective mentality. 
The responses to Fukushima are conditioned by cultural memory; the challenge itself is a function 
of cultural memory, and the responses are constrained by cultural memory. The image of nuclear 
power (Weart, 1988) has a memory function, preparing for future responses.
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Notions of ‘cultural memory’ suggest functional analogies between individual and 
collective remembering. In this light, memory mixes contents on three dimensions: sensory (sensory 
memory), conceptual (symbolic order), and affective (episodes of pride, anger, happiness etc.). 
Memory is not only recall of facts on a decay function, but reconstruction involving imagination for 
a purpose. The primary function of remembering is to retain schematic information for reuse in the 
environment in which we operate: ‘schemas are especially important in guiding memory retrieval, 
promoting memory for schema-relevant information, and allowing us to develop accurate 
expectations of events that are likely to unfold in familiar settings on the basis of past experience in 
those settings’ (Schacter, 1999, p. 197). To prepare us for future action is thus the primary function 
of memory. 
But we also worry about dysfunctions, secondary effects of otherwise adaptive 
remembering: omission from loss and transience, absent-minded insufficient encoding, and 
blockages leave us temporarily or permanently unable to retrieve; in commission we misattribute 
time, place, and persons, and we succumb to social influence and schematic bias. And persistence 
leaves us ruminating and unable to forget. Here critical historical reflection comes to its task to 
correct these contents when they become dysfunctional.   
Bar-Tal (2000) identifies four functions of the social commemoration of events: 
epistemic, national and social identity, preservation of unity, and action guidance. Shared 
images and beliefs are trans-actively shared: when needed, people know who knows what and how. 
A repertoire of beliefs is not accidental, but solves problems of social integration. Images and 
representation facilitate coping with complex situations; different contexts sustain different 
repertoires. Assmann (1992 and 2008) highlights the difference between history and memory; 
cultural memory is relative to time and place, has a reference group, and is to be assessed less on 
‘accuracy’ than on maintaining a tribal sense of community. Cultural memory enables resistance to 
interference, produces and maintains non-simultaneity, and enlarges the present time. The indicators 
of cultural memory are ritual repetition, architecture, and representations in scriptural and 
pictorial media. By contrast, historical reflexivity is the methods by which we check the memory 
for facts or mythical stories. Historians and their critical methods are called to task on convenient 
‘stories’, which only hold the community together and nothing else. However, to explain responses 
to Fukushima, the question of ‘accuracy’ of memory is secondary; prior is its function to cultivate 
acceptance or resistance. Thus, memory is a relatively persistent structure of current activity: who 
are we, what are we doing and how are we doing it?  We can expect that traces of cultural memory 
of nuclear power will explain better the responses to Fukushima than a physical cause & effect 
model. We postulate that cultural memory characterizes the ‘nuclear life world’ of nations and 
includes at least the following indicators:  
The Chernobyl effect is the past response to the accident of 1986, equally measured 
as negative shift in acceptance before and after the event. Past behavior can predict future behavior 
through ‘habit formation’ and ritual commemoration of events. Everyday life is littered with past 
episodes and rehearses them by playfully asking for flashbulb memories ‘… and what did YOU do 
on that day?’ So we might ask: are earlier responses to TMI and to Chernobyl correlated with 
responses to Fukushima? 
Nuclear renaissance: we define as the slope of acceptance from 1996 to 2010. The 
IAEA (1994) called for a ‘nuclear renaissance’ and started to reframe nuclear power as ‘green 
technology’ and, adding little to Green House gases, a solution to global warming. The very idea of 
a ‘re-naissance’ involves the harking back to an earlier ‘golden period’ when nuclear expansion was 
uncontested. This adds ‘sustainable technology’ to those traditional discursive frames of nuclear 
power which included progress, energy autarky, public accountability, cost-effectiveness, 
technology as runaway train to jump-on or being left behind, or a devil’s bargain as Mephistopheles 
had struck (Gamson & Modigiani, 1989). The period 1987 to 2010 was a time of quiet normality for 
the global nuclear park. And the challenges of global warming offered nuclear a different light. 
Stigmatized by earlier accidents at TMI and Chernobyl, since the mid-1990s nuclear seemed 
presentable again in the light of climate change and energy mix scenarios. This discussion took 
place in countries already operating or aspiring to nuclear energy. We can thus easily recognize the 
‘renaissance’ (1996-2010) which renews expectations of a shining nuclear future. We must ask: to 
what extend did public opinion endorse a ‘nuclear renaissance’ 1996-2010, and how did this affect 
the Fukushima responses?   
  Level of acceptance refers to the long-term level measured as central tendency of the 
available historical data between 1996 and 2010. This level reflects the climate of discourse. In 
most countries acceptance fluctuates over time, but it does so at a certain level, which shows that 
the country is overall favoring or rejecting nuclear power. Low levels of acceptance points to a 
dominantly critical discourse, high level of acceptance would suggest a predominantly supporting 
public discourse in commemorating nuclear power, and a mid-level of acceptance traces a history of 
divided opinions and possibly vivid nuclear debates. The history of civil nuclear power reaches 
back to the 1950s, but it rolled out only in the 1970s when also measures of public opinion become 
available. This is the time when the discursive frame ‘Atom = Progress’ lost its credibility and 
resonance (see Weart, 1988; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Bauer, 2015). Ever since, public opinion 
reflects this debate with levels of acceptance and volatility. Thus, again we must ask: how does the 
prior climate of discourse condition the Fukushima response?
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The curated historical database 
We have at our disposal a global database of nuclear opinion covering the years 1977 to 2016. This 
database was curated by the lead author over the past 25 years and contains an unequal number of 
polls per year across a range of 60 countries. The numbers range from 1 to 46 polls in any one year; 
the overall saturation of the database is 18% (see Appendix, Figure A3). The database is of course 
incomplete, as probably the most comprehensive nuclear opinion data-series are not even in the 
public domain. The nuclear issue has a historical legacy of secrecy and incomplete public data, as 
Rose & Sweeting (2016, 114) have observed for data on nuclear incidents.  
Our database reflects diligent academic vigilance to national and international polls of nuclear 
power issues that were publicly reported. Data has been curated over years and compiled in a 
database to track public controversies; nuclear power is an important example, and the database 
served as a continuous teaching resource at the London School of Economics. It was also the basis 
of a book chapter on the history of public perception of nuclear power (Bauer, 2015). The sources 
include international agencies such as Eurobarometer, Gallup, Harris International, IPSOS-Mori, 
and IAEA, and national agencies such as OBSERVA in Italy, Bisconti and PEW in the US, Morgan 
Polls in Australia, and Angus Reid in Canada. Many polls were sponsored by news media such as 
ASAHI in Japan or BBC in the UK and CBS and Washington Post in the US, and Sanomat and 
Confederation of Industry in Finland. Percentage of responses mainly to three basic questions, with 
variations in wording, entered the database, retaining single annual scores:  
 Do you favor or oppose nuclear energy (generally gives the most favorable results, e.g. 
Harris, Gallup, Eurobarometer; considered to operationalize NIABY attitudes, ‘not in 
anybody’s back yard’) 
 Do you favor or oppose nuclear power plants in your area (gives least favorable results; 
seen as an operationalization of NIMBY, ‘not in my back yard’) 
 Do you favor or oppose the expansion of nuclear energy / new build of nuclear power plants 
(produces less favorable responses than the previous question; e.g. CBS, PEW, 
Eurobarometer; operationalizing expansion or status quo) 
Where several polls were reported, the ‘most favorable’ to nuclear power was retained. If there is a 
bias in our database, it is overestimating support for nuclear power. For purposes of analysis, we 
created the ’acceptance’ score on the following definition:   
   
Acceptance = %Favor / [%Favor + %Oppose]   (ignoring DK-responses) 
 
The score’s range is 0-1, with M = 0.451 and SD = 0.084; where 0 signifies near complete 
opposition, 1 means near complete acceptance of nuclear power in the country. A score = 0.5 
indicates a balance of opinion, ignoring DKs. A score < 0.5 indicates more opposition, a score > 0.5 
more favorable views. We are excluding DK-responses because our focus is the balance of opinion 
at each data point. DK-responses vary considerably and depend on the style of interviewing and the 
mode of data collection; ratios are on average around 15%. The analysis of DK-response could be 
an index of ‘ambivalence’ in the micro-dynamics of opinion formation. Over longer observation 
periods, excluding DKs is ‘good practice’ and provides reliable indicators for opinion balances on 
biotechnology (Gaskell et al., 1999) or for general optimism toward new technology (Gaskell et al., 
2011). This curated historical data allows us to revisit Kim et al. (2013) with actually expressed 
opinions before and after the Fukushima accident. 
 
Replicating the EE model and previous regression results 
Firstly, we replicate Kim et al. (2013) in a cross-sectional OLS regression setup. The dependent 
variable is the difference in acceptance before and after Fukushima. For example, in Lithuania, 
acceptance before Fukushima amounted to a net positive acceptance of 19 points, while this 
changed to negative acceptance of -80 points after the accident. Consequently, the shift after 
Fukushima becomes -99 points.
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 Table 1 presents our reanalysis. Our four models match those of 
Kim et al. (2013, p. 826), and the included ‘objective’ predictors are based on their description.6 
While the original models includes data from 42 countries, our analysis draws on aggregated data 
from 28 countries. 20 countries are in both studies, while eight countries are not in the original 
sample.
7
 Most importantly, unlike Kim et al. (2013), we exclude Japan from our sample, as shifts in 
opinion here constitute a response to a ‘traumatic national disaster’, not comparable to responses 
elsewhere. 
Model 1 presents the basic regression model. Generally, the model lends support for 
only some of the observations proposed by Kim et al. (2013). Their prominent explanation is the 
physical distance of a country’s capital from Fukushima (Kim et al., 2013, p. 823). As they explain, 
remoteness of a country either amplifies fears due to lack of relevant information (the distance 
effect), or it mitigates reactions by lowering the probability of radiation exposure (the proximity 
effect). 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
 
The results of Model 1-4 show little support for these effects. Focusing on Model 1, the coefficient 
of distance (ln) is 55.58, meaning that a 1% increase in distance to the Fukushima plant translates 
into a 0.55 more positive opinion after Fukushima. This tendency mimics Kim et al. (2013, p. 826): 
the reaction is more negative the farther away a country is located. However, the effect is not 
statistically significant (p < 0.137) and only becomes significant if we include Japan, but also drops 
to 8.39. Whether geographical distance has a discernible effect on the response to the Fukushima 
accident thus seems highly dependent on the inclusion of one country, which by design is located 
closest to the disaster.  This bodes for a very cautious use of such explanatory factors.  
Model 1 does however reveal more interesting results. Nuclear energy dependence is 
relevant, but also reveals a rather mixed story. Operating a nuclear power reactor should reduce the 
negative impact of Fukushima by 62 points (p < 0.008). This is largely in congruence with Kim et 
al. (2013), although their coefficient was not significant. Our results do however point towards very 
diverse effects of nuclear dependence. Merely having nuclear reactors mitigates the negative effect, 
while nuclear density, i.e. the number of reactors per square kilometres, or the energy mix have 
contradicting and insignificant effects. Total operating experience, measured in number of years 
since a first nuclear power plant was connected to the grid, mitigates the Fukushima effect. As Kim 
et al. (2013, p. 827), one can speculate that a tradition of nuclear energy bring familiarity and 
reduce fear; however a long history could be seen as entrenched risk and exacerbate negative 
responses to disaster. Lastly, 1 pct. change in cumulative operating time (ln) leads to a negative 
shift in acceptance of 0.1594 (p < 0.004), meaning that a 100% different operating experience 
would yield a negative shift in acceptance of 15.9. This only constitutes 0.7 of a standard deviation 
of the Fukushima effect, and is therefore not very substantial. Lastly, the Freedom House Freedom 
of the Press index also mitigates the negative effect of Fukushima. In the index, 0 indicates ‘most 
free’ and 100 ‘least free’. In our country sample, Finland and Sweden obtain the scores of 10, while 
Russia scores 80, as having the most controlled media. A change in press freedom equivalent of a 
standard deviation should therefore lead to less negative shift in acceptance, by an average of 12.6 
points. With Model 2-4, we do not detect any interaction between the distance and operating 
experience, press freedom or earthquake frequency. Contrary to Kim et al. (2013), our analysis does 
not show that the distance from Fukushima influences differently the shifts in nuclear acceptance at 
specific levels of operating experience, press freedom, or earthquake proneness. 
In our second analysis, we utilise the historical time-series of our database. The 
analyses so far investigate determinants of the shift in acceptance after Fukushima, but say little 
about the impact of the incident on national acceptance levels. Table 2 presents panel data models 
using the database’s acceptance score. Model 5 and 6 capture the effect of the Fukushima accident 
for a sample of 23 countries with public opinion data between 1999 and 2012.
8
 Model 5 documents 
random effects for the variables employed in the previous analyses, but also a dummy ‘After 
Fukushima accident’, 0 if the observation is pre-2011 and 1 if post-2011. Controlled for all the 
variables, Fukushima had a significant effect of lowering acceptance by an average of 0.09, or 
roughly 10%.  
[Table 2 near here] 
This estimate is corroborated by the fixed effects regression (Model 6), which only considers the 
average within country shifts in acceptance. The effect of the Fukushima dummy is slightly stronger 
when considering only within country changes, but equally brings a 10% reduction. Compared to 
the average volatility across the 23 countries over the years this is a sizeable effect. Between 2008 
and 2010, the average move in acceptance was positive 0.005 (0.526-0.521), and from 2009 to 2010 
we saw a mean negative change of -0.003 (0.523-0.526). 
Independently, across and within-country time-varying evidence seems to corroborate 
that Fukushima was significant for public sentiment, generally decreasing acceptance levels. The 
controls included in the models show some significant effect. Surprisingly, acceptance declines with 
distance, a 50% increase in distance translates into 27.5% drop in acceptance. This is however only 
a main effect. Model 7 shows the interaction of the pre/post-2011 dummy and distance; remoteness 
mattered to acceptance before Fukushima (β = -0.613, p < 0.029), however the interaction term 
shows no effect post-disaster (β = 0.342, p < 0.164). 
In sum, the Fukushima incident has brought a discernable negative shift of public 
acceptance of nuclear energy across a wide array of countries. This has however been a response 
with large variation; the event does therefore not explain itself the shift. So far, no robust residual 
factors that structure the responses have emerged. An EE model does not explain why acceptance in 
some countries fell drastically while in others the reactions to Fukushima are more modest.  
 
 
Response variation to Fukushima as matter of cultural memory 
Figure 1 below summarizes the movement of global nuclear opinion between 1977 and 2016 from 
our database. Over 40 years, nuclear opinion experiences a bumper ride. The overall picture of 
moving averages suggests three phases: a) declining acceptance from the 1970s to the late 1980s, b) 
recovering support into the new Millennium as a ‘nuclear renaissance’, and c) again declining 
support after 2011. Globally, the linear long-term trend is negative and sides with ‘nuclear 
scepticism’. What we call the TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima effects are indicated by the three 
down-ward pointing bars in Figure 1 on the right hand scale. The year on year median pre-post shift 
in acceptance across all countries with data was -0.109 for TMI (n=11), -0.333, for Chernobyl 
(n=17) and -0.165 for Fukushima (n=32). This shows the total dampening effect on the World’s 
acceptance of nuclear power was largest for Chernobyl, followed by Fukushima and TMI.  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
Aggregate responses to TMI and Chernobyl are weakly correlated (r = 0.08, n=11); the correlation 
of Chernobyl and Fukushima is stronger, r = 0.84 (n=11, without Japan) as shown in Figure 2. 
There is no correlation between TMI and Fukushima (n= 10). The graphs also shows that the 
Fukushima effect responds positively to nuclear renaissance (r=0.21, n=31) and negatively to level 
of acceptance in the country (r= -0.29, n=31). This means, when considering only bi-serial 
correlations, we can say that cultural memory of a ‘renaissance’ and the ‘level of acceptance’ seems 
related to the shifts in public opinion after Fukushima. While the memory of TMI has faded, the 
Chernobyl effect is evident: the stronger the response to the Chernobyl accident, the stronger it is to 
Fukushima. Also, the impact of the renaissance is in evidence: the stronger the slope of increasing 
support, the weaker the Fukushima effect; the stronger the expectations of a nuclear revival, the 
lower the disappointment over Fukushima. Finally, the overall level of acceptance is also directly 
related: the higher the level of acceptance, the stronger the Fukushima effect. Countries with a more 
accepting culture for nuclear power respond more negatively to Fukushima.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
Figure 2 also gives the volatility of acceptance and the nuclear renaissance across 39 countries (see 
also A2 in appendix). A nuclear renaissance is in evidence, but in degrees. Where countries such as 
United Kingdom or Sweden have seen a continuous surge in acceptance after 1996, Belgium, 
France or Germany only saw increased acceptance late in the period. Others shows a stable public 
opinion landscape, as in Denmark or Finland. Overall, the volatility of opinion increases with the 
median level of public acceptance, not so the slopes of a ‘nuclear renaissance’. Countries with a 
more favorable climate of opinion over the past 30 years were also experiencing more volatility (r = 
0.27; n=38) but were not more likely to endorse a nuclear renaissance (r = 0.05; n=38). For the 
former, a curvilinear trend indicates that medium levels of acceptance might be most volatile. 
 
To test the effect of cultural memory suggested by our CR model, we consider two sets of countries 
in Model 1 (M1) and Model 2 (M2); we compare the impact of memory, by holding other 
influences constant. We have data for three memory types, Chernobyl, renaissance, and level of 
acceptance , in 11 countries (M2, excluding Japan), and we have data on renaissance and level of 
acceptance in 23 countries (M1). We have bi-serial data on these indicators for up to 38 countries. 
Table 3 shows the correlations between these variables in bi-serial format, and partial and semi-
partial (part) format. We add as controls economic power, nuclear energy production, and a dummy 
for membership of the Club of Nuclear States. As mentioned before, overall the stronger the 
Chernobyl effect, the stronger is the Fukushima response (r=0.84). The stronger the renaissance, the 
smaller is the negative Fukushima shift (r=0.18), while a favorable climate of opinion increases the 
response (r= -0.15), so does a larger GDP (r= -0.74) and experience with nuclear power (r= -0.47); 
however belonging to the exclusive club with the nuclear defense posture buffers the Fukushima 
response (r= 0.08). These correlations depend however on the set of countries considered. For 
restricted groups of countries (M1, M2), the renaissance becomes a more significant predictor of 
responses and with inverted direction. For the select group of countries, the stronger the 
renaissance, the stronger is the Fukushima response as if built up expectations make for stronger 
disappointment (r= -.73 M1; r=-0.52 M2); this holds if we control for all the other influences. 
Without the memory of Chernobyl, renaissance clearly influences the Fukushima response; 
otherwise Chernobyl is the stronger constraint. Considering partial correlations (in Table 3, in bold) 
controlling other factors, renaissance is the strongest determinant in M2 countries (r=-0.72), while 
others fade out. Among M2, both Chernobyl (0.84) and renaissance (-.50) remain important, and so 
does nuclear experience (-0.39), Club membership (0.31) and GDP (.20) in that order. The level of 
acceptance is however not significant (0.12). 
[Table 3 near here] 
In summary, the CR model shows that beyond GDP and Club membership, which mitigate the 
Fukushima effect, and the nuclear power experience of a country, which accentuates it, cultural 
memory adds significant explanatory power, showing that the legacy of Chernobyl and the nuclear 
renaissance 1996-2010 directly affect the responses to Fukushima. The stronger the renaissance, the 
stronger the disappointment with nuclear power.   
 
Grouping the response variation post-Fukushima 
To further investigate these effects we conduct a hierarchical cluster analysis of countries in order 
to group them according to the cultural memory dimension. We identify three clusters of countries 
based on renaissance (i. e. the linear trend of nuclear acceptance levels from 1999 to 2010) and the 
Chernobyl effect. The analysis covers only a small portion of countries with time-series opinion 
polls data for both nuclear disasters (N = 11 and N =23). Noting that the small number of cases may 
lead outlying countries to exert great influence on the cluster solution, we utilize a weighted average 
linkage, hierarchical cluster analysis. Groups of countries are combined by comparing the distance 
between the weighted averages of two groups (Hair et al, 2010). Furthermore, because of disparate 
in ranges
9
, we standardize the factors as z-scores, though this remains debated
10
 (Miligan & Cooper, 
1988; Hair et al. 2010). Without standardizing, one variable could dominate the solution.  The 
dendrograms in the appendix (Figure A2) summarize the agglomerative clustering of countries with 
Euclidean distances. In order to decide on a feasible cluster solution, we examined the Duda/Hart 
pseudo T
2
. The three-cluster solution resulted in the lowest value for both sets of countries 
indicating that this grouping is the most distinct. 
 
Response variation post-Fukushima in M1 (23 countries) 
Examining the three clusters for set M1 reveals patterns with respect to countries’ history of nuclear 
acceptance and their response to Fukushima. Table 4 presents the within-cluster means for nuclear 
renaissance, acceptance level, and Fukushima effect. Cluster 1 covers only Greece, which has a 
very low historic level of acceptance. Greece also experienced a moderate renaissance, and saw the 
smallest shift post-Fukushima. Conversely, the countries in cluster 2 had the largest negative 
response to Fukushima (42%). Compared to cluster 1, the four countries in cluster 2 have 
traditionally been much more accepting of nuclear energy (M=0.666), the highest of all clusters, 
and had no nuclear renaissance 1996-2010. Figure 3 plots the M1 countries on the two clustering 
components, and clearly shows that cluster 2 unites the two countries with a negative renaissance. 
Lithuania and Romania have not been rebuilding expectations for a bright nuclear future before 
Fukushima. It thus seems that countries with traditional high level of acceptance and a declining 
trend 1996-2010 experienced the most severe responses to Fukushima.  
The third cluster of M1 countries is the largest. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 3, 
these countries have generally had moderate historic levels of acceptance (M= 0.459). As Greece, 
these countries have seen a surge after 1996 with a slope of 0.009, but as depicted in Figure 5, this 
varies a great deal. Poland has seen acceptance decline proportional to the trend in Hungary, while 
Switzerland lived through a remarkable renaissance. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Fukushima effect is situated between that of cluster 1 and 2, with a 18.5 point drop.  
[Figure 3 near here] 
 
Response variation post-Fukushima in M2 (11 countries) 
In the second analysis, we group countries according to both nuclear renaissance and prior 
Chernobyl effect. Again, the analysis yields three clusters as depicted in Figure 3. The clustering of 
the 11 countries on cultural memory into three groups corresponds well to the Fukushima response. 
Cluster 1, with only Italy, exhibits the largest Chernobyl effect, but also had a strong renaissance 
1996-2010. The Italian response to Fukushima was the most negative. 
For Cluster 2, a common denominator is the moderate prior response to Chernobyl, on 
average roughly -32 points, which is 25 points less than in Italy. The countries in cluster 2 also 
experienced a nuclear renaissance, but less steep than Italy. The trend was 0.00062, while Italy’s 
was 0.0181. This central trend does however cover a broad range of nuclear renaissances. Cluster 2 
comprises countries with moderate renaissance, Germany and France, and also USA, which 
experienced no renaissance or even a decline or negative slope. Figure 3 plots the (non-
standardized) values of the two cluster components for each country. The scatterplot also reveals 
that the countries in cluster 2 have had very different responses to Chernobyl, from 16 points in 
Denmark to 38 points in Germany. 
Looking across this group of countries, they also had less severe responses to 
Fukushima. In Italy, Chernobyl and Fukushima response were consistent, Fukushima being slightly 
less negative (6 points). The same dynamic is evident in cluster 2. On average, these countries saw a 
drop in acceptance levels of 21.75 points, which is 11 points less than for Chernobyl. A more 
moderate response to Chernobyl, combined with a moderate nuclear renaissance, corresponds with 
a less drastic response to Fukushima. 
 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
This point is also interesting for cluster 3, comprising Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Greece, 
Netherlands, and the UK. These countries responded strongly to Chernobyl, on average -14.67 
points. Also, these countries had very diverse nuclear renaissances. While Finland, Ireland and 
Greece saw a slight renaissance, the Netherlands and UK have seen the larger surges in nuclear 
acceptance 1996-2010. It thus seems that a modest nuclear renaissance cushions less abrupt 
responses to Fukushima. Examining the Fukushima response in these countries support this notion 
further. Within this group of 11 countries, Finland also had the smallest Fukushima effect with a 
negative shift of 7 points. Likewise, Ireland experienced a drop in acceptance of 8.5 points, the third 
smallest drop behind Belgium’s 8 points. 
Our analysis thus suggests four cultural dispositions to respond to Fukushima. Firstly, 
Greece and Italy as isolated cases respond negatively from a low and a high prior level of 
acceptance. Secondly, Former Eastern European nuclear operators with no renaissance and high 
levels of prior acceptance show sharp negative responses to Fukushima (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Romania). Thirdly, Denmark, France, Germany, and USA with little nuclear renaissance 
but a strong legacy of Chernobyl. And finally the largest group of nuclear operators, where little 
nuclear renaissance and moderate prior nuclear enthusiasm correspond with only moderate negative 
shifts after Fukushima (UK, Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, etc.).  
In conclusion, our analysis on a CR model points to recognizable patterns in country 
responses to the Fukushima accident.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we set out to explain the global variation of public opinion responses to the events in 
Fukushima 2011; we do this in a context where it is widely recognized that public consent is pivotal 
for any nuclear future. Historically, the global responses are consistent with the severity of nuclear 
events; public opinion responded most strongly to Chernobyl 1986, followed by Fukushima 2011 
and TMI 1979. Overall, public opinion responds in proportion to the events. The Fukushima 
incident has brought another discernable negative shift in public acceptance of nuclear energy 
across a wide array of countries. This has however been a response with large variation; the event 
does therefore not explain itself the shift; this response is locally contingent. 
To examine this variation we replicated an earlier study which, based on an implicit 
event-effect (EE) model, assumed that only ‘objective’ factors condition local reactions. We argue 
that an EE model unrealistically assumes that physical collision contact is the key factor of opinion 
formation. We showed that the EE model explains very little variance when using historical opinion 
data rather than retrospective accounts of opinion change. The model does not explain why 
acceptance in some countries fell drastically while in others the responses to Fukushima are more 
modest.  
We offer an alternative, the challenge & Response (CR) model, which postulates cultural memory 
as the symbolic mediator of responses at a distance from the events. We show, that the prior 
responses to Chernobyl, the ‘nuclear renaissance’ 1996-2010, and the long-term level of 
acceptance, jointly and independently, explain better the formation of the Fukushima effect across a 
wide array of countries.  
Our CR model shows that beyond GDP and Club membership, which mitigate, and 
the total nuclear experience of a country, which accentuates the Fukushima effect, cultural memory 
adds the more important explanatory power. The legacy of Chernobyl and a nuclear renaissance 
1996-2010 directly affected opinion responses to Fukushima. The more negatively countries 
responded to Chernobyl in 1986, so they did to Fukushima 2011, and the stronger the nuclear 
renaissance, the more disappointment with nuclear power after Fukushima. The long-term climate 
of opinion does not matter so much; the above dynamics occur in different discursive situations.   
Our analysis also grouped countries according to their patterns of cultural memory and 
their Fukushima response. We were able to characterize four patterns of responses to Fukushima 
contingent on cultural memory of nuclear power. Firstly, prior reactions to past nuclear accidents 
structure the present response. All countries have experienced drops in the proportion of citizens 
who hold positive views of nuclear energy, but in countries where prior reactions to Chernobyl 
1986 were less severe, the reactions to Fukushima was also more moderate. Secondly, the 
renaissance of nuclear positivity provides additional explanatory context. Country differences aside, 
it seems that a stronger renaissance of nuclear expectations 1996-2010 corresponds with a more 
drastic response to Fukushima. Conversely, where the level of acceptance eroded over the long 
period, further negative shifts after 2011 were less severe.  Overall, it thus seems that a long-term 
level of acceptance with divided opinions and a modest nuclear renaissance cushioned the responses 
to the events in Japan in 2011.  
 
The limitations of our approach are several: the global picture which we are able to 
paint is neither complete nor unequivocal. The impact of prior disaster responses, the long-term 
climate of discourse, and the role of a ‘nuclear renaissance’ in structuring responses to nuclear 
disaster need further investigation. This calls for comparative case studies between and within our 
clusters with more detail on the public debates. Secondly, our database of public opinion is 
incomplete and not saturated over the period. We hope that in the not too distant future, national 
agencies and nuclear industries in different countries, such as EDF in France, or Japan’s Prime 
Minister Office, will make available their long-series of nuclear opinion data held in private for 
further public research. This would allow to progressively saturate the historical database and allow 
researchers to test or reformulate the CR models. Thirdly, our CR model to nuclear accidents also 
asks for historical mass media maps to index the public discourse. We were unable to collate such 
data for the range of the present comparative analysis. However, such longitudinal mass media 
indicators might be within reach if we consider the novel techniques of on-line data scraping, 
automatic text classification and sentiment analysis which are enabled by the progressive 
digitization of news archives. It would clearly be desirable to compile a more complete historical 
corpus of public opinion data in conjunction with maps of mass media coverage and sentiments 
reaching back to the 1970s, when it all began. Nuclear power has much to show about the dynamics 
of techno-scientific developments and their perceptions in public opinion.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 provides an overview of the variables used in the cross-sectional and panel analyses and 
in the cluster analysis.  
Table A1. Coding of variables for regression analyses. 
Variables Description Measurement Source 
 Acceptance 
 
Balance of opinion per 
survey 
%Favor / 
%Favor+%Reject 
Own database 
 Fukushima effect Shift in balance of 
opinion 
Post-Pre acceptance 
(2011 
Own database 
 Renaissance Recovering acceptance Slope of acceptance, 
1996-2010 
Own database 
 Acceptance level Average acceptance 
1996-2010 
 
Mean acceptance 1996-
2010 
 
Own database 
 Chernobyl effect Shift in balance of 
opinion 
Post-Pre acceptance 
(1986) 
Own database 
 Club Member Nuclear bomb status 1= Nuclear capability   
0 = no capability 
Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientist annual report 
2016 
 Distance from 
Fukushima 
(logarithmic 
transformation) 
Natural logarithm of the 
distance between the 
Fukushima power plant 
to a country’s capital 
Kilometers Free Map Tools 
 Nuclear power 
reactors 
Whether or not nuclear 
power reactors are 
operated in a country. 
0 = No reactors 
1 = At least 1 reactor 
IAEA 
 Number of reactors 
per 100.000 sq. km. 
Number of reactors in 
operation (yearly) 
(IAEA) per 100.000 sq. 
km. of national land 
surface area (World 
Bank) 
Number IAEA and World Bank 
 Proportion of nuclear 
power 
Proportion of energy 
deriving from nuclear 
reactors (yearly). 
Percent IAEA 
 Total operating 
experience(logarithmic 
transformation) 
Number of years since 
first national reactors 
was connected to 
national electricity grid. 
0, 1, 2, …, Y.  IAEA 
 Freedom of the Press  0-100 with 0 being most 
free press and 100 least 
free. 
Quality of Government 
Dataset 
 Significant 
earthquakes 
 
Cumulative number of 
earthquakes rated 
significant by the USGS 
in 2011. For panel 
models, the number of 
significant earthquakes 
occurring that year. 
Number U.S. Geological Surveys 
 Nuclear accidents Number of nuclear 
accidents identified by 
The Guardian
A
 based on 
IAEA data since 1952. 
Number IAEA 
 GDP per cap. 
(logarithmic 
Natural logarithm of per 
capita GDP in current 
Number Quality of Government 
Dataset 
transformation) prices (US dollars) in 
individual years. 
Note: 
A 
:
 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-power-plant-accidents-list-rank#data 
 
The variables used in the replication of Kim et al. (2013) have been coded following their 
descriptions (see section 3.3. and Table 1 in Kim et al., 2013: 824). 
Distance from Fukushima: The distance from a county’s capital to the Fukushima Daiichi Power 
Plant as the crow flies measured using Free Map Tools (2017). We take the natural logarithm to the 
distance to ensure linearity and mimic the decision taken by Kim et al. (2013: 825). 
Nuclear power reactors, Number of reactors, Proportion of nuclear power, Total operating 
experience: Data pertaining to the prevalence of nuclear power in a country is coded from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) PRIS database on nuclear power reactors (IAEA, 
2017). We coded whether a country operated a functioning nuclear power reactor connected to the 
electricity grid in a given year (Yes = 1, No = 0), the number of such reactors in operation divided 
by 100.000 sq. km. of national land surface area of the country (World Bank, 2017), the yearly 
percentage of energy deriving from nuclear reactors, and the natural logarithm of years since the 
first reactor was connected to the electricity grid. 
Freedom of the press and GDP per capita: Freedom of the press scores build on the Freedom 
House Freedom of the Press score taken from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 
2017). The variable refers to the QoG variables fhp_score4 (1996-2001) and fhp_score5 (2001-
2012). GDP per capita is measured as the natural logarithm om GDP per capita for each country, 
and corresponds to the QoG variable wdi_gdpcapcur.  
Significant earthquakes: The cumulative number of earthquakes within a country deemed to be 
“significant” by The U.S. Geological Surveys (USGS). In the corss-sectional analysis, the reference 
year is 2011, while the panel analysis includes data from each year from 1999-2012. The number of 
earthquakes were recorded from the USGS list of significant earthquakes. The definition of a 
significant earthquake rests on three types of significance: 
 Magnitude significance: 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 × 100 × (
𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒
6.5
) 
 Pager significance: Green = 0, Yellow = 500, Orange = 1000, Red = 2000 
 “Did you feel it” (DYFI) significance: 
min(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠, 1000) ×
max (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)
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These are combined to form the overall significance: 
max(𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝐷𝑌𝐹𝐼 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 where a 
significance above 600 is deemed significant. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Overview of countries included in regression analyses. 
 Included in Kim et al. (2013) Not included in Kim et al. 
(2013) 
Included in cross-sectional 
regressions 
[N=28] 
 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Greece, 
Iceland, India, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Turkey, USA. 
Australia, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Sweden, United Kingdom. 
Included in various panel 
regressions 
[23 <= N <=39] 
Total k = 260 surveys 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Greece, 
Iceland, India, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Turkey, USA. 
Australia, Belarus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hungary, Germany, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Norway, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, 
United Kingdom,  
 
Not included 
[N=23] 
Bangladesh, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Cameroon, China, Colombia, 
Egypt, Georgia, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Iraq, Kenya, 
Macedonia , Malaysia, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia ,Serbia, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Vietnam,  
 
Note: We excluded Japan from our cross-sectional and regression analyses, as a nuclear accident in the country of 
origin constitutes a very different ‘Challenge & Response’ from that of other countries at a distance. Underlined are 
countries which are members of the ‘Club’ commanding nuclear weapon systems.  
 
Figure A1. The nuclear renaissance 1996-2010, best documented countries [n=23; not Japan]. 
[Figure A1 here] 
 
Figure A2. Dendrograms for cluster solutions of M1 (n=23) and M2 (n=11). 
[Figure A2(a) & A2(b) here] 
Note: Hierarchical clustering with weighted-average linkage and z-standardised variables. The three-cluster solution 
yields a Duda/Hart pseudo T
2
 of 6.45 (M1, n=23) and of 2.78 (M2, n=11).  
 
 
Figure A3. The number of countries in the historical data for each year, 1977-2016. 
 [Figure A3 here] 
 
Note: The database contains unequal number of polls per year across a range of 60 countries. The numbers range from 1 
to 46 polls in any one year. It seems that opinion have become more frequent and more global after 2000 with the 
advent of the ‘nuclear renaissance’. The data collection is obviously serendipitous and not systematic across all 60 
countries; existing data might not be unknown to us, thus there are missing values. The database contains 426 historical 
data points from 60 countries between 1977 and 2016 which is a saturation of 18% (2340 possible data points = 60 
countries x 39 years). The defined acceptance score has M = 0.451; Median = 0.479; SD = 0.084, and a range of 0.053-
0.886 (source: Bauer nuclear opinion database; the data used here is available to interested researchers on request).   
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Table 1. Determinants of Fukushima impact on nuclear opinion balance. Cross-section 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Distance from Fukushima 
(logarithmic transformation) 
55.58 
(35.54) 
-43.64 
(97.80) 
71.59 
(95.04) 
69.72 
(59.99) 
Nuclear power reactors 61.86** 
(20.68) 
63.84** 
(21.30) 
60.23* 
(25.53) 
58.35* 
(26.00) 
Number of reactors per 
100.00 sq. km. 
444.8 
(319.2) 
477.4 
(327.2) 
437.4 
(331.9 
598.3 
(606.7) 
Proportion of nuclear power -0.094 
(0.214) 
-0.090 
(0.225) 
-0.076 
(0.257) 
-0.059 
(0.245) 
Total operating experience 
(logarithmic transformation) 
-15.94** 
(4.832) 
-279.6 
(243.3) 
-15.87** 
(5.096) 
-15.87** 
(5.088) 
Freedom of the Press 0.834** 
(0.237) 
0.895** 
(0.253) 
5.770 
(26.49) 
0.578 
(0.830) 
Significant earthquakes 
 
0.095 
(0.058) 
0.100 
(0.063) 
0.093 
(0.065) 
9.742 
(27.73) 
Nuclear accidents -7.343 
(4.831) 
-8.298 
(5.263) 
-7.252 
(5.172) 
-6.725 
(5.483) 
GDP per cap.  
(logarithmic transformation) 
2.467 
(5.328) 
2.699 
(5.642) 
2.098 
(6.032) 
-0.044 
(9.717) 
Distance from Fukushima × 
Total operating experience 
 29.03 
(29.03) 
  
Distance from Fukushima × 
Freedom of the press 
  -0.550 
(2.960) 
 
Distance from Fukushima × 
Significant earthquakes 
   -1.041 
(2.992) 
Constant -557.1 
(299.8) 
337.4 
(877.1) 
-699.1 
(821.9) 
-655.8 
(454.8) 
N 28 28 28 28 
Adj. R
2 
0.429 0.430 0.396 0.400 
Note: β-coefficients from OLS-regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable ‘Fukushima 
effect’ is the difference in mean nuclear opinion balance (proponents – opponents) from 2008-2010 and 2011, and 
ranges from -100 to 100. **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Fukushima impact on nuclear acceptance. Panel models  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
After Fukushima accident -0.091*** 
(0.025) 
-0.102*** 
(0.025) 
-3.208 
(2.240) 
Distance from Fukushima 
(logarithmic transformation) 
-0.549* 
(0.271) 
 
 
-0.613* 
(0.281) 
Nuclear power reactors 0.059 
(0.074) 
 0.060 
(0.076) 
Number of reactors per 100.00 sq. 
km. 
-575.0 
(463.9) 
-555.5 
(1328) 
-550.1 
(474.1) 
Proportion of nuclear power 0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Total operating experience 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0 .002 
(0.002) 
Freedom of the Press 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0 .003) 
Significant earthquakes 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Nuclear accidents 0.025 
(0.021) 
0.029 
(0.031) 
0.027 
(0 .021) 
GDP per cap.  
(logarithmic transformation) 
-0.051
†
 
(0.030) 
-0.086
† 
(0.046) 
-0.050
†
 
(0.030) 
After Fukushima accident × 
Distance from Fukushima 
  0.342 
(0.246) 
N (country-years) 159 159 159 
N (countries) 23 23 23 
Country fixed effects No Yes No 
Rho
 
0.455 0.455 0.474 
Note: β-coefficients from random and fixed effects OLS-regression with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is an acceptance index scaled 0-1, where 0 equals 0-percentage acceptance, 0.5 equals equal 
opposing and accepting views, and 1 implies full acceptance. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, 
†
: p < 0.1. 
 
  
Table 3. Bi-serial and partial correlations for cultural memory indicators   
Fukushima effect [neg. shift] Correlation Partial correlation Semi-Partial 
correlation 
Cultural memory Bi-serial M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Chernobyl effect 1986 .837**  .813***  .843***  .718*** 
Renaissance 1996-2010 .175** -.728*** -.519*** -.718*** -.503*** -.699*** -.266*** 
Acceptance level 1996-2010 -.147** -.038 -.070 .068 .118 .046 .054 
Path dependency [controls]        
GDP ln -.074* -.093 .069** -.006 .200** -.004 .093** 
5-yr total nuclear power -.467** -.212 -.360*** -.122 -.387** -.083 -.192*** 
Member Bomb Club [1=bomb] .084* -.170 -.121*** -.122 .310*** .055 .149*** 
Countries N 11-38 23 11 23 11 23 11 
Note: countries n=11 including Chernobyl effect; n=23 without Chernobyl effect and not including Japan;  
*** = p<0.001; ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05 
  
Table 4. Clusters of Fukushima Responses for 23 countries and 11 countries 
23 countries 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Clustering components    
Nuclear renaissance 0.0073 -0.0243 0.0093 
Mean acceptance level 0.1389 0.6660 0 .4590 
    
Fukushima effect -11.50 -42 -18.51 
Countries in cluster Greece Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Romania 
Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, USA, 
United Kingdom 
11 countries 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Clustering components    
Nuclear renaissance 0.0073 -0.0243 0.0093 
Mean acceptance level 0.1389 0.6660 0 .4590 
Fukushima effect -11.50 -42 -18.51 
Countries in cluster Greece Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Romania 
Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, USA, 
United Kingdom 
Note: Within-cluster mean scores across clustering components and Fukushima nuclear disaster effect. Country 
groupings based on hierarchical weighted average cluster analysis. Underlined are countries which are member of the 
‘Club’ commanding nuclear weapons systems.  
 
  
Figure 1. The Chernobyl and Fukushima effect on nuclear acceptance, 1977-2016. 
 
Figure 2. Bi-variate correlations of responses to TMI (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and 
Fukushima (2011); and volatility and nuclear renaissance compared to long-term levels of 
acceptance. 
 
Figure 3. Clusters and long-term Level of Acceptance, Chernobyl Effect and Nuclear 
Renaissance for (M1) 23 countries and (M2) 11 countries. 
 
                                                          
1
 Questions about attitudes first asked respondents whether they strongly favored, somewhat favored, somewhat 
opposed, or strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy for electricity at the time of the poll, and secondly, what their 
view was before the earthquake in Japan. 
2
 One of the first and natural social-psychological responses to an aversive incident is the ‘us versus them’ 
demarcation:  ‘this could not happen here; our machines are different, our operators are reliable …..’.  A revised risk 
assessment of local operations is only a secondary step.  
3
 Spencer Weart (1988) refers to ‘collective representation’ when discussing US historical images of the atom. We 
prefer the more flexible notion of ‘social representation’ to allow for social comparison.  
4
 The CR model would suggests that we consider the media coverage of Fukushima, in intensity, framing and valence as 
a fourth indicator of cultural memory, but we were unable to compile comparable data across very different studies; and 
too few countries are covered. Media attention marks ritual rehearsal. Printed words and visuals keep past events alive. 
Retelling of stories is known to be simplifying and assimilating to locally conventions similar to ‘Chinese whispers’ 
(Bartlett, 1932). Answers to the question, did media coverage condition the Fukushima effect, will have to come from 
future research; our CR model offers the framework.  
5
 Consequently, our dependent variable is theoretically bounded, and can only take on values between -100 and 100. 
This is essentially a breach of the Gauss-Markov assumptions underlying ordinary least squares. OLS is only the best 
linear estimator under the assumption of linearity in the parameters and a continuous, unbounded dependent variable 
(Berry, 1993: 12). However, the attitude change variable is fairly normally distributed and only a single case, Lithuania, 
is near the theoretical bounds. 95 pct. of countries experience attitude changes from -42 points to +18 points. 
Furthermore, an examination of augmented partial residuals for each independent variable do not reveal any major 
breaches of the linearity assumptions. Based on these considerations, OLS yields the most intuitive results, without 
exhibiting overt breaches on key modelling assumptions. 
6
 See Table A and accompanying text in the appendix for a full overview of the sources and scaling of variables. 
7
 See Table A2 in the appendix material for countries covered in the analyses. 
8
 See Figure A1 in the appendix for the 23 countries covered in the analyses. 
9
 Our slope measure of nuclear renaissance ranges from -0.01346 to 0.02324, while the measure for the negative Chernobyl 
effect ranges from -57 to -9. 
 
10
 The z-score is calculated by subtracting the mean value of the variable and dividing this number by the variables standard 
deviation. The z-standardized variable then has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
 














